Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
CUMBERLAND FARMS NORTHERN, INC.
v.
Alfred T. PIERCE et al.
Argued March 5, 1963.
Decided April 30, 1963.
Motion for Rehearing and Clarification Denied
June 25, 1963.
Headnotes
**405 *490
Appeal from orders and decisions of the Milk Control Board made pursuant to RSA
ch. 183 and/or writ of certiorari.
Another action involving
the same parties is a bill in equity No. 5124,
N.H., 190 A.2d 414 which raises substantially the same issues. This Court granted plaintiff's motion to
consolidate the cases for purposes of oral argument and filing briefs, but so
far as possible the cases were to be treated as separate and distinct. Other pertinent facts appear in the opinion.
Burns, Bryant &
Hinchey and E. Paul Kelly, Dover, Robert F. McNeil, Boston, Mass., and Alfred
B. Stapleton, Providence, R. I., for plaintiff.
William Maynard, Atty. Gen., and Alexander J. Kalinski, Asst.
Atty. Gen., for defendants.
*491 Booth,
Wadleigh, Langdell, Starr & Peters, Manchester, for New Hampshire Milk
Dealers Association, as amicus curiae.
Tiffany & Osborne,
Concord, for The Granite State Dairymen's Association, as amicus curiae.
WHEELER, Justice.
The plaintiff is a New
Hampshire corporation leasing and operating a plant at Portsmouth, New
Hampshire for purposes of processing and bottling milk in gallon jugs. The Portsmouth plant was recently
constructed at a cost of some $300,000.
The plaintiff proposes to engage solely in selling milk in gallon and
half gallon jugs on a cash and carry over-the-counter basis.
On September 25, 1962 the
plaintiff filed with the Milk Control Board nine applications **406 for
distributor's licenses. Under date of
October 1, 1962 it filed a second set of nine applications in substitution for
the original set. The latter set
differed from the first in that they did not specify any 'average amount of
milk sold daily' but stated that the two-dollar fee was 'as per fee schedule
RSA 183(9) for over-the-counter distributors.'
A hearing was held by the
Board upon the applications on October 26, 1962 and at the conclusion of the hearing the plaintiff
was notified that additional licenses would be required for each of five
outlets from which it proposed to conduct its so-called 'jug operations,' and
that the Board should first be advised of the location of these outlets. The plaintiff's manager, Mr. Haseotes, was
also advised that the Board had approved the pending applications for
distributor's licenses and would act upon and approve 'whatever applications
for retail milk licenses his two corporations would apply for.'
Under date of October 29,
1962 the Board issued to the plaintiff nine distributor's licenses 'for the
purpose of selling more than two quarts and not more than 20 quarts of milk
daily' in each of nine different areas within the state. On November 1, 1962 the plaintiff commenced
the sale of milk in gallon and half gallon containers at the established prices
of 51 cents a half gallon, and $1.02 a gallon, over the counter, at five
outlets in four of the nine areas for which it had been issued licenses.
These five locations were
specified in four additional applications executed by the plaintiff under date
of October 31, 1962 which were received by the Board together with $10 in fees
on November *492 2, 1962. Under
date of November 2, 1962 by letter to plaintiff's counsel the Board denied these
applications 'because they [Cumberland Farms Inc.] are selling milk without
licenses now.' On November 5, 1962 the
plaintiff filed in the Rockingham County Superior Court a petition for mandamus
seeking to compel the issue of licenses for
its five retail stores. This petition
was dismissed on motion of the Board on November 7, 1962 upon the ground that
the plaintiff had an adequate remedy under RSA ch. 541.
In the meantime from
November 1 to November 9, 1962 the plaintiff sold milk, over the counter, at
its five outlets at the prices established by the Board. On November 9, 1962
however, the plaintiff reduced its prices to 79 cents per gallon and 49 cents
per half gallon. On the same day the
Board notified the plaintiff that a hearing would be held on November15, 1962
to determine why its nine distributor's licenses issued October 29, 1962 should
not be revoked. This hearing was postponed to November 26, 1962. Also on November 9, 1962 criminal complaints
were instituted by the Board against the plaintiff.
On November 16, 1962 the
plaintiff filed with the Board a motion for rehearing with respect to the
Board's order of October 31, 1962, which continued in effect its prior general
orders and regulations with respect to milk prices. On November 21, 1962 the
plaintiff filed with the Board a motion for rehearing with respect to the
November 2, 1962 order of the Board denying the plaintiff's applications for
five licenses for retail outlets.
On November 23, 1962 the
plaintiff filed in the Superior Court the bill in equity now before us (No.
5124) which sought a temporary order to enjoin the Board from holding the
proposed hearing of November 26, 1962 for the purpose of revoking the
plaintiff's nine distributor's licenses.
This relief was denied by the Superior
Court and following a hearing on November 26, 1962 the Board ordered the nine
distributor's licenses revoked 'because of repeated violations of the law' by
the plaintiff. On the same date the
Board denied both of the plaintiff's pending motions for rehearing of its
previous orders.
In compliance with the
order of November 26, 1962, the plaintiff surrendered its **407 nine
distributor's licenses, and it has sold no milk in New Hampshire since that
date.
On December 1, 1962 the
plaintiff filed with the Board an application for a license 'for sale of milk
outside of State of New *493 Hampshire pursuant to RSA 183:10 and
183:11.' On December 6, 1962 this
application was denied by the Board, and the fee which accompanied it was
returned, upon the ground that the statute 'does not set up a separate license
classification for distributors who distribute milk outside the State only,'
and that prior applications by the plaintiff had been denied 'for violations of
the milk control law.' By letter also
dated December 6, 1962, the plaintiff's counsel requested the Board to
reconsider this order.
On December 14, 1962 the
plaintiff filed a motion in Superior Court to amend its pending bill in equity
(No. 5124) to seek an order which would vacate the revocation of its nine
distributor's licenses by order of the Board on November 26, 1962, and permit
the plaintiff to resume over-the-counter sales in jugs. At a conference in the Superior Court on
December 17, 1962 an agreed statement of
facts was proposed preparatory to transfer of the plaintiff's bill in equity to
this court. On December 26, 1962 this
appeal, or petition for certiorari (No. 5110) was filed in this court. On January 18, 1963, after hearing in this
court, temporary relief sought during the pendency of the appeal was denied. Cumberland Farms Northern, Inc. v. N. H.
Milk Control Board, 104 N.H. 364, 187 A.2d 388. However, on February 8, 1963, the plaintiff was authorized by
order of this court after hearing, to utilize the Portsmouth plant for the
processing of milk procured and to be sold outside of New Hampshire.
Certain procedural
questions will first be considered. It
is contended by the Board and by amici that the plaintiff, by its
failure to file with the Board a motion for rehearing following its order of
November 26, 1962 which revoked the plaintiff's nine distributor's licenses and
by its further failure to move for a rehearing of the Board's decision of
December 6, 1962 denying plaintiff's application for a license to sell milk
outside the state, is now precluded from questioning these orders, since the
provisions of RSA 541:22 relating to appeals from orders of the Board make the
statutory appeal an exclusive remedy.
See RSA 183:18.
For reasons which will
hereinafter appear we do not consider that these omissions are fatal to proper
consideration of the major issues which are presented by this appeal.
[1] While the plaintiff in the cases now before us questions the
procedures adopted by the Board and its interpretation of the statute, its
attack upon the statute upon constitutional grounds *494 is understood
to proceed upon comparatively narrow grounds.
Recognizing apparently that the right to exercise the powers granted by
section 7 of the act has properly been made to depend upon preliminary findings
which must satisfy specified prerequisites, yet the plaintiff contends that
once such findings have been made, no suitable standards are provided by the
statute to guide and control the Board in its determination of what the maximum
or minimum prices to be fixed shall be.
Although the present
section 6 is only incidentally involved in these proceedings the plaintiff
asserts that it, as well as section 13, was held unconstitutional in Opinion of
the Justices, 88 N.H. 497, 190 A. 713.
And while the plaintiff recognizes that the present section 7 (then s.
6) was upheld by the same opinion, and the act in general by Cloutier v. State
Milk Control Board, 92 N.H. 199, 28 A.2d 554, it urges that both of these
opinions should be reconsidered in the light of the facts presented by the
pending litigation, and that section 7 should now be held unconstitutional.
Particular emphasis is
placed by the plaintiff upon more detailed provisions found in other statutes,
as an indication of the short-comings of the New Hampshire act. See **408 State v. Stoddard, 126
Conn. 623, 13 A.2d 586; State v. Auclair, 110
Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107. We do not consider
that this comparison demonstrates any fatal defect in our own statute.
As was pointed out in
Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 497, 499, 190 A. 713, 714, 'the power of the
board to establish prices is dependent upon the prevalence of an economic
condition injurious to public health in a definite marketing area, and the existence
of this condition in such area must first be found as a fact * * *.' Having found that the facts warrant
regulations, the Board is then subject to the requirement that prices fixed by
it must be 'just and reasonable' (s. 7, supra), a comprehensive standard which
has long been recognized and applied in this jurisdiction in the field of
public utility regulation. RSA
378:7. Grafton County Electric Light
& Power Co. v. State, 77 N.H. 539, 94 A. 193; New England Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. State, 98 N.H. 211, 218, 97 A.2d 213.
See Gordon v. Public Service Co., 101 N.H. 372, 143 A.2d 428.
In our judgment, greater
particularization of factors to be considered in establishment of 'just and
reasonable' prices such as may be found in some other milk control statutes, is
not a constitutional requirement, and may in practice serve to limit rather
than promote a broad consideration by the Board of all factors which in a
particular case may reasonably be thought relevant in *495 determining
prices which shall be just and reasonable from the standpoint of varied and
frequently conflicting interests. In
this connection it is of interest to note
that the statute before the Court in State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 13 A.2d
586, supra, resembled the statute considered in Ferretti v. Jackson, 88 N.H.
296, 188 A. 474, in that it imposed no standards to be followed in fixing
prices, and that the Connecticut Court thought that mere consideration of
certain 'cost factors' which an amendment of the statute required, did not
provide an adequate standard. However a
still more recent amendment of the Connecticut statute enacted after the
violation before that Court was committed, provided for the first time that the
administrator should 'cause prices to be just and reasonable' and specified
factors to be considered in arriving at just and reasonable prices. State v. Stoddard, supra, 126 Conn. 623,
632, 13 A.2d 586. Similarly the Vermont
statute, upheld by the Court in State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107,
supra, required the board to fix 'the just reasonable minimum or maximum price,
or both.' Id., 155, 4 A.2d 110.
[2] It seems obvious to us that in fixing prices
which are 'just and reasonable,' the Board is bound to and does consider among
other things the costs which are incurred by the distributor whose price is
being regulated. See American Can Co. of Mass. v. Milk Control Board, 316 Mass.
337, 55 N.E.2d 453. The fact that the
statute does not expressly prescribe that the Board shall do this, in our
judgment does not operate to invalidate the statute.
[3] With respect to the present section 6 of the statute, it is true,
as the plaintiff points out, the Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 497, 498, 190
A. 713, 714, stated that it, and what is now section 13 of the act, were
invalid '[s]o far as [they] purport to confer upon the board general authority
to regulate and control the milk industry.'
This statement indicates that the provisions of the present section 6
were not regarded as invalid for all purposes, but only to the extent that they
purported to confer unlimited 'general authority to regulate * * * the * * *
industry.' Properly confined in
practice to powers auxiliary to the price-fixing authority validly granted by
§ 7, the provisions of § 6, many of which relate to duties rather
than powers are deemed not to detract from the powers validly granted by § 7. See
Conway v. N. H. Water Resources Board, 89 N.H. 346, 351-352, 199 A. 83. It was under the present section 6 that the
regulations upheld in Cloutier v. State Milk Control Board, 92 N.H. 199, 28
A.2d 554, supra, were issued. Id., 203,
28 A.2d 557.
**409 Upon
reconsideration we reaffirm the constitutionality of the *496 milk
control law. Gordon v. Public Service
Co., supra, 101 N.H. 372, 375, 143 A.2d 428; Abbotts Dairies v. Armstrong, 14
N.J. 319, 102 A.2d 372; State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118
N.J.Eq. 504, 179 A. 116; United States v. Rock Royal Corp., 307 U.S. 533,
574-576, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446.
See Cumberland Farms Inc. v. Milk Control Commission, 340 Mass. 672, 166 N.E.2d 356.
[4] In questioning the procedures of the Board,
in particular with reference to its findings of July 27, 1962 and order of
October 31, 1962, the plaintiff argues that before price controls can be
imposed, the Board must first find that there has been 'an actual loss or
substantial lessening of a supply of milk in a specified market.' With this interpretation of the statute we
cannot agree.
The Board entered its
order of October 31, 1962, continuing in effect its prior rules, orders, and
regulations following a public hearing on September 25, 1962. In making the order, it found that 'the
public health is menaced, jeopardized and likely to be impaired and
deteriorated by the loss and a substantial lessening of a supply of milk of
proper quality in each one of the areas now under control, if price controls at
the producer and resale levels are removed.'
Section 7 of the act
authroizes the Board to change prices fixed by it 'after such notice and public
hearing as deemed by the board in the public interest.' RSA 183:7.
The findings quoted above were made following notice of a hearing on the
issue to which the findings relate. The
findings themselves precisely embodied the factors which the statute prescribe
as prerequisite to the imposition of price controls. RSA 183:7, supra. Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 497, 190 A.
713, supra; Petition of Associated Grocers,
103 N.H. 302, 171 A.2d 37. The statute
does not contemplate that the Board shall take remedial action after 'actual
loss or substantial lessening of a supply' has occurred, as the plaintiff
argues, but preventive action, when the specified harm is 'likely,' or
threatened. We therefore consider that
the findings made were sufficient to warrant the continuation of existing
controls.
[5] The scope of review in this court of the
findings and orders of the Board is circumscribed by the provisions RSA 541:13
which provides: 'Burden of Proof. Upon the hearing the burden of proof shall
be upon the party seeking to set aside any order or decision of the commission
to show that the same is clearly unreasonable or unlawful, and all findings of
the commission *497 upon all questions of fact properly before it shall
be deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable; and the order or
decision appealed from shall not be set aside or vacated except for errors of
law, unless the court is satisfied, by a clear preponderance of the evidence
before it, that such order is unjust or unreasonable.'
The problem therefore is
not whether this court or some other tribunal would have reached a different
conclusion from that reached by the Board, but whether, taking the evidence as
a whole, the Board could reasonably have found as it did, the burden being upon
the plaintiff to satisfy this court 'by a clear preponderance of the evidence'
that the orders of the Board are 'unjust and
unreasonable.' Plymouth Village Fire
District v. Water Pollution Comm'n, 103 N.H. 169, 167 A.2d 677.
[6] The defendants do not question that the
plaintiff's appeal from the findings and order of October 29, 1962, effective
October 31, 1962 is properly before us.
While they raise a question as to the findings of July 27, 1962, as to
which the plaintiff filed no motion for rehearing in accordance with the
statute (RSA 541:3), the findings of July 27, 1962 were 'adopted and
incorporated by reference' in the findings of October 29, 1962, and hence are
deemed to be properly before us on the appeal from the latter findings, and the
accompanying order.
**410 The order of
October 31, 1962 continued in effect 'all rules, orders and regulations and
amendments thereto, previously adopted and promulgated by the Board and now in
effect.' The order was entered after it
had been found on October 29, 1962 in substance that the public health was
likely to be impaired and deteriorated by loss of a supply of proper quality
milk if price controls were removed, because milk produced elsewhere would come
into the state, with adverse effect upon the production of an adequate daily
supply within the state. The findings
of July 27, 1962 which were incorporated by reference in the findings of
October 29, 1962 in effect established that close alignment with basic prices
in competing out-of-state markets was necessary to the stabilization of New
Hampshire markets, and that the New England Basic Price Formula for determining prices 'is the most
equitable procedure yet developed.'
Those findings also determined that 'if a gallon jug operation were set
up in New Hampshire the source of supply would be from out of state unregulated
markets,' and that the price of a gallon jug should be established at 'twice
the price of the half gallon *498 out of the store,' and the wholesale
price at the announced price per quart, regardless of size of container.
[7][8][9] The plaintiff contends that the findings
were not warranted by the evidence. A
review of the record of the hearings held July 10 and September 25, 1962,
discloses a considerable volume of testimony from producers, processors, and
distributors, as well as from physicians, and experts in the field of
marketing. The fact that much of it
consisted of opinions of the witnesses did not make it incompetent. A detailed review of the testimony is not
thought to be necessary, but in summary it justified the conclusion that in the
last several years the cost of producing a higher quality milk has spiraled
upward; that price controls, both as to producers and distributors are
essential in order to establish fair market practices, and as to consumers in
order to guarantee an adequate supply of high grade milk; that they assure the
farmer a reasonable financial return and encourage the continuance of sanitary
controls; and that where price controls have been abolished market wars among
the large milk distributors have resulted, with a consequent reduction in the price paid to the
producer. It had before it specific
evidence from an expert witness, to which it could properly give weight, that
the 'Board * * * has no other sound alternative' than to "follow the
formula' and to preserve close alignment with prices in Boston and other New
England Federal order markets.' We
think the Board could reasonably find that if price controls were removed in
this state, the price paid producers would go down, as well as the quality of
milk, and that the public health would thereby be likely to be menaced. There is no reason to hold that the order
for the continuation of price controls constituted a violation of the Federal
Constitution. Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940.
[10] The plaintiff asserts that the Board's
recognition of the significance of the New England Basic Price Formula
established by Federal Market Order in Boston, Massachusetts, demonstrates that
the Board is 'blindly following' that formula in disregard of its own
duties. We see no reason to accept this
assertion. The dominant influence of
price in the central market at Boston as affected by Federal orders is beyond
avoidance and one which the Board could not properly ignore. See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,
315 U.S. 110, 62 S.Ct. 523, 86 L.Ed. 726; Bowring, 'Study of the History, Administration
and Operation of RSA 183 Relating to Milk *499 Control,' Univ. of N. H.
Agricultural Economics Research Mimeograph No. 29, (Oct. 1961) pp. 13-19.
It is noteworthy that under milk control the price of a quart of
milk delivered in this state as of August 1962 was less than in other
areas. For example there was evidence
that the price in Manchester was **411 27.5 cents; Boston, Massachusetts
29-30 cents; Hartford, Connecticut 30 cents; New York City 31.5 cents; Chicago,
Illinois 29.5-33.5 cents; Washington, D. C. 29 cents. The New Hampshire farmer in 1961 received $5.39 per cwt. for
milk, which was more than farmers then received in Vermont, Maine, New York,
New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
Some of the evidence
indicated an antipathy against the so-called gallon jug operations as a
demoralizing factor to the price structure because unless the price of milk per
gallon was established at a rate competitive with the price of quarts delivered
at the doorstep, many dealers in the state would be unable to compete due to
the cost of establishing a gallon bottling plant. The plaintiff's operations were viewed with alarm by one expert
who pointed to 'the hurricane warnings, or at least the storm clouds on the
horizon which threaten the continued stability of New Hampshire markets,' and
then referred to the plaintiff's distributing plant in Portsmouth, to be
supplied with 'unregulated milk.'
The Board in its findings
of July 27, 1962 adopted a similar view, and found that New Hampshire
distributors if compelled to compete with gallon prices such as prevailed in
southern New England would be forced to obtain their supply from these same 'unregulated markets' which
would result in the loss of a market for New Hampshire producers now supplying
New Hampshire distributors, which might be disastrous. The Board then set the price of a gallon jug
at twice the price of a half gallon sold 'out of the store.'
[11][12] While
fair practice may be required both under the milk control act and under the
Unfair Sales Act (RSA ch. 358) '[n]o legislation may restrict or authorize the
restriction of competition and free enterprise to the point of absolute
control.' Opinion of the Justices, 88
N.H. 497, 499, 190 A. 713. 'An order
that a competitor may not take advantage of his methods and opportunities
merely because those with whom he competes do not employ his methods or have
his opportunities, is beyond the scope of regulative power.' Cloutier v. State
Milk Control Board, 92 N.H. 199, 205, 28 A.2d 554, 558. At the same time, the
Board was entitled to consider the effect in *500 other areas of the
unregulated sale of milk in gallon jugs.
See Report of Special Subcommittee of Select Committee on Small
Business, 86th Congress, 2d session, House Report No. 2231 'Small Business
Problems in the Dairy Industry,' pp. 26-27, 55-56, 64-66 (1960). We are constrained to believe that the
evidence of hostility toward gallon jug operations in this case persuaded the
Board to establish a price sufficiently high to make it uncompetitive. The evidence revealed that with the proper
equipment milk sold in gallon jugs for cash over the counter could be sold
profitably at a lower price than in quarts.
[13][14][15] It is
significant that during the pendency of this litigation the Board issued an
order on February 25, 1963 establishing a price order which among other things
substantially reduced the price for milk sold in gallon jugs. It is common knowledge that a number of
distributors are now engaged in the gallon jug operation in the state at a
reduced price. Since it thus appears
that the order of October 31, 1962, so far as it related to milk in jugs is no
longer controlling, the issue with respect to this feature of the findings of
July 27 and October 29, 1962 is considered to be moot. In other respects, the findings and order
are sustained. The plaintiff's
complaint that because questions were put to its general manager by the
chairman of the Board, the Board acted in violation of its own rule (RSA
183:13) that there would be no cross-examination of witnesses, does not appear
to us to rise to the level of reversible error. The plaintiff's appeal from the order of October 31, 1962 is
dismissed.
By order dated November 2,
1962, the Board denied the plaintiff's applications for licenses for its five
retail stores. Its appeal from this
order is conceded to be properly **412 before us. Consideration of the issues thus presented
requires some review of the circumstances which preceded entry of the order.
[16][17] We
think that section 9 of the act, relating to licenses, may reasonably be
construed, as it has been in practice by the Board, to require that any distributor shall have a license for
each 'market designated by the Board' in which it proposes to conduct its
business. RSA 183:9. In defining the fees for the licenses
required by section 9 the statute provides that 'an over-the-counter
distributor' shall pay an annual fee of two dollars, without regard to the
quantity of daily average sales. Id.,
§ 9.
The plaintiff applied for distributor's licenses for each of nine
marketing areas designated by the Board, by substitute applications which
specified *501 no daily average sales but stated that the licenses
applied for were for 'distributor only:
over-the-counter for consumption not on premises (store)' and that the
fees paid totaling $18 were 'for over-the-counter distributors.' In so doing
the plaintiff complied with the statutory requirements (RSA 183:9) and under
date of October 29, 1962 the Board issued licenses to the plaintiff upon the
basis of these applications.
We are of the opinion that
the Board was in error in requiring the plaintiff to thereafter file
applications for additional licenses for the five retail stores which it
proposed to operate in four of the nine areas in which it had been granted
distributor's licenses; and that when it operated those stores in compliance
with the Board's price regulations between November 1 and November 9, 1962 it
did so as a licensed distributor, under valid licenses, and so far as the
record discloses, in good faith.
If the form of the
licenses issued by the Board was not appropriate and some different form should have been issued, the
plaintiff should not have been penalized on that account. Similarly if the Board issued the licenses
in advance of receipt of required information as to the location of the stores
within the marketing areas in question, the plaintiff was not properly held at
fault for selling milk before the information reached the Board.
The plaintiff's appeal
from the order of November 2, 1962 as to which it duly moved for rehearing is
sustained upon the ground that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction and
authority in requiring additional licenses for the plaintiff's five retail
outlets and in denying such licenses on the ground that the plaintiff was
'selling milk without licenses now.'
[18][19][20] The issues relating to the order of November
26, 1962 revoking the licenses issued on October 29, 1962 are not presented by
appeal, since the plaintiff failed to move for rehearing as required by the
appeal statute. RSA 541:3, 22. Admittedly after November 9, 1962, the
plaintiff's operations were not in compliance with the Board's price regulations,
and its conduct in this respect furnished ground for revocation of its licenses
by express provision of the statute.
RSA 183:9. On the same day that
the order of revocation was entered, the plaintiff's motions for rehearing with
respect to the orders of October 31 and November 2, 1962 were denied, so that
it was then in a position to prosecute appeals from those orders to this
court. RSA 541:6. Pending in the Superior Court was its bill in equity questioning the validity of the
milk control law and of the orders entered thereunder; and like issues *502
were presented in the criminal actions also pending against the plaintiff.
Within the twenty days
allowed by the statute for a motion for rehearing (RSA 541:3, supra) the plaintiff sought immediate relief by
filing in the Superior Court in its pending equity action an amendment seeking
an order vacating the November 26, 1962 order of the Board. The circumstances do not require that the
plaintiff be held guilty of laches as a matter of law in failing to seek relief
by appeal (cf. Cumberland Farms Northern Inc. v. N. H. **413 Milk
Control Board, 104 N.H. 364, 187 A.2d 388, supra) particularly since the appeal
from the order of November 2, 1962 was to present much of the same factual
background.
[21] The order of November 26, 1962, was grounded
in part upon the erroneous conception that sales made on or after November 1,
1962 were made without a license. This
was an error of law, as distinguished from an erroneous determination of issues
of fact correctable solely upon appeal. Cloutier v. State Milk Control Board,
92 N.H. 199, 201-203, 28 A.2d 554. As
such, the error is open to correction in the exercise of this court's original
jurisdiction on certiorari. Cloutier v.
State Milk Control Board, supra, 92 N.H. 202, 28 A.2d 556-557.
Accordingly the case will
be remanded to the Board for reconsideration of its order of November 26, 1962, which must depend
for its validity solely upon the plaintiff's violation of price
regulations. We think that justice
requires that the Board reconsider this order in the light both of its
erroneous action with respect to the order of November 2, 1962 as pointed out
herein, and of the severity of the penalty already imposed upon the plaintiff
to date, by denial for some five months of the privilege of selling milk in New
Hampshire in accordance with established prices. The change in circumstances resulting from the recent order of
February 25, 1963, establishing special prices for sales in jugs also calls for
reconsideration of the November 26, 1962 order, since the prior denial of
special prices appears to have been a factor in the plaintiff's violation of
previously applicable price regulations.
[22] There remains for consideration in this
opinion the appeal from the order of December 6, 1962 denying the plaintiff's
application under RSA 183:10 and 11 for a license for sale of milk outside of
the state. While the plaintiff filed
with the Board no document formally styled a 'motion for rehearing' of this
order, it did, by letter of counsel forwarded the same day, seek to have the
order reconsidered by the Board. This
'application' (RSA *503 541:6) was neither granted nor denied by the
Board. RSA 541:5. Neither the Board's
omission, nor the failure of the plaintiff to request a rehearing in statutory
language should be taken to preclude consideration of the order upon
appeal. In view of the circumstances in
this case, we therefore treat the
plaintiff's contentions with respect to it as properly before us.
[23] RSA 183:10 and 11 require a distributor's
license for any person 'who purchases or receives within the state' over two
quarts of milk for sale or distribution without the state. The license fee imposed is the fee
established by section 9 of the chapter, less any fee paid to the state of sale
or distribution. Such a requirement is
obviously necessary if purchases within the state for export are not to be
permitted to disrupt established intrastate practices. The requirement is not discriminatory, nor
is it invalid as a burden upon interstate commerce. Milk Control Board of Pennsylvania v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S.
346, 59 S.Ct. 529, 83 L.Ed. 752; see State of Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S.
199, 204, 81 S.Ct. 929, 6 L.Ed.2d 227; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68
S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.Ed. 1460. Denial of a
permit to the plaintiff because of its prior violations of regulations of the
Board does not appear to us to be analogous to the circumstances considered in
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 657, 93 L.Ed.
865, cited by the plaintiff.
[24] The plaintiff's application was denied both
upon the ground of its prior violations of the law, and upon the further ground
that the statute 'does not set up a separate license classification' for this
type of operation. Both grounds were
technically correct. Yet while the
statute provides only for the licensing of 'distributors,' we see no reason to
imply a requirement that an applicant for a
license to sell 'without the state' under RSA 183:11, must also be **414
licensed under RSA 183:9 as a distributor who 'sells * * * within the
state.' RSA 183:2.
The appeal from the order
of December 6, 1962 is therefore remanded to the Board for reconsideration in
the light of this opinion in conjunction with its reconsideration of the order
of November 26, 1962. Pending such
reconsideration, the order of this court entered on February 8, 1963,
authorizing the plaintiff to use the Portsmouth plant for the processing of
milk for out-of-state sale is continued in effect.
Appeal sustained in part
and dismissed in part; remanded.
All concurred.
N.H. 1963
190 A.2d 403, 104 N.H. 489
END OF DOCUMENT