Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
NEW HAMPSHIRE RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIATION
v.
STATE TAX COMMISSION.
No. 6527.
Sept. 28, 1973.
Headnotes
*512 **890
McLane, Graf, Greene & Brown, and Michael P. Hall, Manchester (Stanley M. Brown, Manchester, orally), for
plaintiff.
Warren B. Rudman, Atty.
Gen., and Charles G. Cleaveland, Nashua, attorney (Cleaveland, Nashua, orally), for defendant.
LAMPRON, Justice.
Petition for a writ of
prohibition seeking reversal of the commission's interpretation of RSA ch. 358
(Unfair Sales Act) issued on September 13, 1972, pertaining to the minimum
price at which cigarettes may be sold.
Hearing before a Judicial Referee (Amos N. Blandin, Jr.) who made
various findings of fact and rulings of law
including a finding that the commission's interpretation of the Act was
contrary to its purpose and intent. The
referee transferred **891 without ruling the propriety of the remedy
sought and the correctness of the commission's interpretation of RSA ch. 358,
the latter being the central issue to be decided. The referee also transferred without ruling the question whether
the commission's action has violated the constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws of the retailers who sell cigarettes.
*513 [1][2] The
commission contends that neither a writ of prohibition nor of mandamus is the
proper remedy because the issuance of an interpretation of the Act is within
the administrative powers the legislature granted to the commission. It suggests that certiorari is the proper
remedy to correct the commission's alleged erroneous interpretation. '(I)n this State it is unimportant whether
the process be called certiorari, or be given some other Latin or English
name.' Dinsmore v. Mayor and Aldermen, 76
N.H. 187, 190, 81 A. 533, 535 (1911).
The parties are entitled under the established practice in this State to
the most convenient procedure for the settlement of their controversy. State v. Harkaway, 105 N.H. 42, 46, 192 A.2d
619, 622 (1963). We hold that the present controversy can be properly
adjudicated in the present proceeding.
Davis, Administrative Law Text s 24.07 (3d ed. 1972).
RSA 358:1 reads in part as
follows: 'The term 'cost to the retailer' shall mean the invoice cost of the
merchandise to the retailer, or the replacement cost
of the merchandise to the retailer . . . whichever is lower . . . to which
shall be added (1) freight charges not otherwise included in the cost of the
merchandise (2) cartage to the retail outlet if performed or paid for by the
retailer . . . (3) a mark-up to cover in part the cost of doing business, which
mark-up, in the absence of proof of a lesser cost, shall be six per cent of the
total cost at the retail outlet.'
RSA ch. 78 which imposes
on tobacco products a direct tax upon the consumer at retail (s 7-a) provides
that it be precollected by, among others, the wholesaler who affixes stamps
purchased from the State to the package before it is sold to the retailer. RSA 78:7 (Supp.1972), 9. The controversy centers on whether or not
the tobacco tax should be included in the retailer's cost for the purpose of
figuring the six percent mark-up provided for by the statute.
The referee made the
following findings: 'To aid in the enforcement of the minimum price of
cigarettes, for many years the defendant Tax Commission has published and
distributed to retailers a 'Cigarette Minimum Price Sheet'. In order to carry out its interpretation of
RSA ch. 358, the Tax Commission also for many years has published and distributed
*514 to retailers a list of prices of cigarettes computed on the basis
of the retailer's total cost, inclusive of the tobacco tax.' This was the 'unvarying consistent
interpretation by the defendant Commission since the Unfair Sales Act was
passed in 1941 and until September 13, 1972.'
'The New Hampshire Legislature has
repeatedly impliedly approved this interpretation.'
The referee also found the
following: 'On September 13, 1972 the Tax Commission issued an interpretation
of RSA ch. 358 directing that the minimum six per cent markup on retail tobacco
sales should be figured on the cost at the retail outlet, exclusive of the
tobacco tax. This interpretation was
issued for the purpose of lowering the market price of cigarettes in the hope
that lowered prices would produce more cigarette sales and thereby increase the
State's tobacco tax revenues.' 'In
conformity with the September 13, 1972 interpretation of RSA ch. 358, the
Commission issued a price sheet on September 15 following.' 'The Commission's actions of September 13
and 15, 1972, singled out cigarettes for discount pricing, while other items
sold by retailers must still be priced six percent above the retailer's total
cost, inclusive of tax.'
[3]
The divergent meanings attributed to the statute by the parties to this
proceeding **892 on the issue of cost to the retailer demonstrate the
ambiguity of its language in that regard.
See Note, Constitutionality of Statute Prohibiting Sales At Less Than
Cost, 47 Yale L.J. 1201, 1203 (1938). It is a well established principle of
statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible
interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its
implementation without any interference by the legislature is evidence that
such a construction conforms to the legislative intent. Trice v. City of Cranston, R.I., 297 A.2d
649, 652 (1972); see Bellows Falls etc. Co. v. State, 94 N.H. 187, 190, 49 A.2d 511,
512-513 (1946).
[4]
It is uncontradicted that as administrator of the Unfair Sales Act with regard
to tobacco products, the tax commission, through its tobacco tax division (RSA
78:23) and now by its miscellaneous tax division (RSA ch. 77- C (Supp.1972)), *515
has interpreted the statute as providing that the 'total cost at the retail
outlet' on which the six percent markup was to be calculated included both
federal and state taxes. The fact that
this administrative interpretation of the statute went unchallenged for a
period of over 30 years, that is, from its enactment in 1941 to the change in
interpretation September 13, 1972, is entitled to great weight in determining
the intended meaning of the statutory language. Bellows Falls &c. Co.
v. State, 94 N.H. 187, 190, 49 A.2d 511, 512-513 (1946). Furthermore, instead of interfering with the
previous interpretation, the legislature, as found by the referee, has
repeatedly impliedly approved that interpretation by using it in estimating the
revenue to be expected from various increases made in the tax rate on
cigarettes. See Laws 1965, 132:1; Laws
1967, 159:1; Laws 1970, 5:10; Laws 1971, 475:1; 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law
s 253 (1962).
The interpretation supported
by the plaintiff is consonant with business practices as it bases the markup on
the capital the retailer must invest to place the cigarettes on his
shelves. That portion invested by him
in the tax, state and federal, is not
recovered unless and until he sells the cigarettes. It is to be noted that the
commission does not seek the elimination of the federal tax from the cost on
which the markup is based. Finally the
referee properly found that the defendant's recent interpretation of RSA ch.
358 and its subsequent actions in issuing price sheets in accordance therewith
permit and encourage unfair competition in the form of sales below cost
contrary to the purpose of the Unfair Sales Act.
We hold that the interpretation
placed on the statute by the referee is the meaning intended by the
legislature; the total cost at the retail outlet on which the six percent
markup allowed by RSA 358:1 is to be computed includes the tobacco tax
precollected from the retailer by the wholesaler of cigarettes under RSA ch.
78. We do not consider Harvey Payne,
Inc. v. Slate Co., 345 Mass. 488, 188 N.E.2d 562 (1963), relied on by the
defendant to be controlling. As pointed
out by that court, their statute, unlike ours, had received at different times
somewhat different administrative *516 interpretations. In view of the result reached, it is
unnecessary to consider other issues raised by the parties.
The defendant is ordered
to forthwith reinstate the prior interpretation of RSA ch. 358 thus including
the state tobacco tax in the total cost at the retail outlet on which the six
percent markup is to be computed in arriving at the minimum price for
cigarettes under the Unfair Sales Act.
It follows that any 'Cigarette Minimum
Price Sheet' contrary thereto is to be withdrawn and all future price sheets
are to conform to the interpretation of the statute held to be correct in this
opinion.
Petition granted.
KENISON, C.J., did not
sit; the others concurred.
N.H. 1973.
309 A.2d 890, 113 N.H. 511
END OF DOCUMENT