Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
SEXTON MOTORS, INC. et al.
v.
RENAULT NORTHEAST, INC.
No. 80-316.
June 10, 1981.
Headnotes
**117 *461
Devine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch, Manchester (John T. Broderick, Jr.,
Manchester, on the brief and orally), for Sexton Motors, Inc.
Prunier, Mazerolle &
Frasca P. A., Nashua (Gerald R. Prunier, Nashua, on the brief and orally), for
Colonial Imports Corp.
Keefe & Keefe, Wilton
(John M. Keefe, Wilton, on the brief and orally), for defendant.
KING, Justice.
The plaintiffs, Sexton
Motors, Inc. and Colonial Imports Corp., both automobile dealers in Nashua,
brought suit seeking injunctive relief and damages
against the defendant, Renault Northeast, Inc., a distributor of Renault
automobiles. The plaintiffs alleged
inter alia that the defendant had violated RSA ch. 357-B (Supp.1979), which
regulates business practices between motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors,
and **118 dealers, and that the defendant also had breached an agreement
to repurchase certain automobile parts from Sexton Motors' inventory. The defendant appeals from a judgment in
favor of plaintiff Sexton Motors in the amount of $12,500.00 for violation of
RSA ch. 357-B (Supp.1979) and $22,592.41, subject to the return of the parts to
the defendant, for its breach of the agreement to repurchase the parts. Finding no error, we affirm.
Sexton Motors was a
franchised dealer of Renault, Fiat, Lancia, and Peugeot automobiles. Although Renault automobiles have not
enjoyed the widespread acceptance in the United States that some other
foreign-made automobiles have, Sexton Motors had a successful record of sales
and, in some years, sold more Renault automobiles than any dealer in the
Northeast. After experiencing some
financial difficulties, however, in 1977 Sexton Motors began attempts to sell
its business.
On January 15, 1978,
Sexton Motors and Colonial Imports executed a purchase and sale agreement. According to the terms of the agreement,
Sexton Motors would transfer all of its cars, inventory of parts, and equipment
to Colonial Motors for a specified price.
Sexton Motors was to arrange for the transfer to Colonial Imports of its franchise agreements
with the four manufacturers. The
agreement provided that Colonial Imports would not be obligated to honor the
agreement if it did not receive the franchises. *462 Fiat, Lancia, and Peugeot quickly transferred the
franchise rights to Colonial Imports, but Renault refused.
On January 26, 1978,
Renault's general manager visited Colonial Imports to discuss Colonial Import's
application for a franchise but refused to approve the transfer of the Renault
franchise from Sexton Motors to Colonial Imports. Renault's main objection to
transferring the franchise to Colonial Imports was apparently that Colonial
Imports was a multi-franchise dealer.
Because the franchise agreement between Sexton Motors and Renault,
specified that Sexton Motors could not assign the franchise rights without the
prior written approval of Renault, Sexton Motors could not honor its agreement
with Colonial Imports.
Under the franchise agreement
between Sexton Motors and Renault, in the event of termination of the
agreement, Renault was obligated to repurchase from Sexton Motors' inventory
only Renault parts that had been purchased within six months prior to the
termination. Notwithstanding this
provision, Renault informed Sexton Motors by letter dated April 19, 1978, that
Renault would repurchase Sexton Motors' entire inventory for $22,592.41.
In May 1978, Sexton Motors
and Colonial Imports proceeded to close the purchase and sale agreement with
respect to the other franchises. Sexton
Motors also transferred to Colonial Imports
the Renault parts, although the record before us does not indicate precisely
when this occurred. The parties reduced
the purchase price and placed $12,000.00 in an escrow account. Under the terms of the escrow agreement,
Sexton Motors was to receive the escrow fund if Colonial Imports received the
Renault franchise by the end of 1978.
Renault continued to refuse to transfer the franchise to Colonial
Imports, and the escrow fund eventually was paid to Colonial Imports. By the summer of 1979, however, Colonial
Imports obtained a Renault franchise from American Motors Corporation, which
was by then responsible for awarding Renault franchises.
On July 21, 1978, Sexton
Motors and Colonial Imports instituted this suit against Renault for violation
of RSA ch. 357-B (Supp.1979) and breach of its contract to repurchase the
parts. After a hearing, the Master
(Charles T. Gallagher, Esq.) issued his report and recommended judgment for
plaintiff Sexton Motors in the amount of $12,000.00 and for plaintiff Colonial
Imports in the amount of $22,592.41, subject to the return of the parts to
Renault. The Trial Court (Bean, J.)
approved the master' report. Upon
motions by Sexton Motors and Renault to set aside the master's report, the
master issued a second report. This
report recommended *463 that Sexton Motors' motion to set aside the
report be denied. The **119
report also recommended that the judgment in favor of Colonial Imports be
stricken and judgment for Sexton Motors be awarded in the identical amount of
$22,592.41, subject to the return of the
parts. The court also approved this report,
and Renault appealed.
(1)
Renault argues that the application of RSA ch. 357-B (Supp.1979) to the
franchise agreement between itself and Sexton Motors violates the
constitutional provision against retrospective legislation. N.H. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 23. Specifically, Renault asserts that the
parties formed the agreement on January 1, 1966, and that the statute did not
become effective until August 1, 1973.
Furthermore, Renault contends that the fact that the franchise agreement
was for a one-year period subject to automatic renewal for one-year periods is
of no consequence because our decision in Geldhof v. Penwood Associates, 119
N.H. 754, 407 A.2d 822 (1979), established that a newly-enacted statute may not
be retrospectively applied to a pre-existing contract even if the contract is
within a renewal period. Renault
presented this same argument to the master, who rejected it.
The master distinguished
this case from Geldhof on the ground that the plaintiff in that case sought to
apply a newly-enacted statute to a pre- existing contract in the midst of a
renewal period, see Geldhof v. Penwood Associates, supra 119 N.H. at 754, 407
A.2d at 823, whereas in this case the statute became effective in August, 1973,
and the last of the renewal periods began on January 1, 1978. The master concluded that each of the
one-year renewals was a new contract and that, because the statute was in
effect for more than four years prior to the 1978 renewal, the application of
RSA ch. 357- B (Supp.1979) to that contract
would not be retrospective. We agree
with the master.
(2)
Renault next argues that the master's finding that Renault violated RSA ch.
357-B (Supp.1979) is not supported by the record. Renault contends that it did not unreasonably restrict the sale,
transfer, or assignment of the Renault franchise in violation of RSA 357-B:4
III (i) (Supp.1979) or RSA 357- B:9 (Supp.1979). Renault has failed, however, to supply this court with a
transcript of the trial. Therefore, the
issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the master's findings
cannot be raised. Paine v. Paine, 119
N.H. 874, 876, 409 A.2d 790 (1979); McCrady v. Mahon, 119 N.H. 247, 248- 49,
400 A.2d 1173, 1174 (1979); see Appeal of Earl K. Anderson, 120 N.H. 749, 750,
422 A.2d 1043, 1045 (1980).
*464 (3) Renault also argues that Sexton Motors was not
entitled to damages for Renault's failure to transfer the franchise to Colonial
Imports because Sexton Motors and Colonial Imports had obtained an injunction
prohibiting Renault from transferring the franchise to anybody. This contention merits little
discussion. The clear purpose of the
injunction was to preserve the franchise for Colonial Imports in the event the
plaintiffs prevailed in their action.
The defendant's argument that a transfer of the franchise to Colonial
Imports would violate the injunction and that the injunction, rather than it,
prevented the transfer of the franchise to Colonial Imports has little merit.
(4)
Renault argues that it was error to award damages to Sexton Motors for
Renault's breach of the agreement to repurchase the parts inventory of Sexton
Motors because neither Sexton Motors nor Colonial Imports pleaded the breach.
This assertion overlooks the posture and pleadings of the case below. Sexton Motors and Colonial Imports filed
joint pleadings in this case. Colonial
Imports then filed a motion to amend the pleadings by adding an additional
count. That pleading alleged inter alia
that the defendant had failed to repurchase the parts as it had promised. In this jurisdiction, we treat pleadings
liberally, and the pleadings are adequate if they inform counsel of the dispute
and enable the court to decide the case on its merits. Berlinguette v. Stanton,
120 N.H. 760, 761, 423 A.2d 289, 290 (1980); Morency v. Plourde, 96 N.H. 344,
346, 76 A.2d 791, 792 (1950).
(5)
Although the alleged breach of contract contained in the additional count was **120
not artfully pleaded, it was sufficient to meet the minimum criteria. It is true that the pleadings do not set out
the facts giving rise to the alleged breach, but they did adequately give
notice to Renault that Colonial Imports alleged a breach of contract to
repurchase the parts. If the pleadings
failed to set forth sufficient facts to enable Renault to formulate a defense,
it should have contested the sufficiency of the pleadings at the trial. We will not review the sufficiency of the
pleadings after the case has been tried
without objection to the pleadings, because allegedly defective pleadings can
be corrected by amendment after the trial.
Lakeport Nat. Bank v. Loring, 80 N.H. 337, 339, 116 A. 638, 640 (1922);
McDonald v. Smith, 79 N.H. 143, 143-44, 106 A. 558, 559 (1919).
(6)
That the court entered judgment in favor of Sexton Motors notwithstanding the
fact that Colonial Imports pleaded the breach does not require reversal of this
case.Sexton Motors and Colonial *465 Imports sued Renault in a joint
action, and the allegations contained in the initial pleading and the
allegations contained in the additional count concerned the same events. Consequently, Renault was not prejudiced by
the master's determination that the cause of action for the breach of contract
belonged to Sexton Motors rather than Colonial Imports.
(7)
Renault's remaining arguments concerning Sexton Motors' recovery for the breach
of the contract to repurchase the parts concern the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the master's actions. Absent
an adequate record, the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
findings of the master cannot be raised.
Paine v. Paine supra.
Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.
Affirmed.
All concurred.
431 A.2d 116, 121 N.H. 460
END OF DOCUMENT