Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
BUSS
v.
PUTNEY.
January Term, 1859.
*1 To entitle the
vendor of a machine, sold with the right to use a patented article therewith,
to recover the price agreed to be paid, it is not incumbent on him to produce
evidence of his right under the patent, unless it appears that the vendee has
been interrupted in the use of the patented article, by one whose right, prima
facie, is violated by its use.
Such sale implies a
license to the vendee to use the article patented, and the license is not
within the provision of section 11 of the act of congress of July 4, 1836, (5
Statutes at Large 121) which requires the assignment of a patent, or of any
interest therein, or the grant of the exclusive right under the patent, to make
and use the patented article, to be in writing.
ASSUMPSIT, for a lathe and
"one wedger and right to use Allen's saw therein." The plaintiff
offered evidence tending to show that he sold and delivered the lathe and
wedger to the defendant, including in the sale the right to use with it a patented saw known as Allen's saw, which
the plaintiff claimed to own. The defence set up was, that the sale was made
and the property delivered to one Whitney, and not to the defendant. The
property was not returned to the plaintiff, nor the contract in any way
repudiated by the defendant, nor did it appear that he had been interrupted in
the use of the saw by any person claiming that his right under the patent was
violated by its use.
There was evidence that
the plaintiff, soon after the delivery of the machine, tendered to the
defendant a deed, signed by the plaintiff, reciting that Allen had obtained
letters patent for "an improvement in machines for slitting clothes
pins," which Allen had assigned by deed to the plaintiff; that the defendant
was desirous of acquiring the right, under the patent, to use, and vend to
others to be used the invention whenever he did not wish to use the same
himself, for, to, and in his mill in Marlborough; and had contracted with the
plaintiff for the purchase of the same, and conveying and assigning to the
defendant, for the consideration of thirty dollars paid, the right under the
patent to use, or vend to others to be used, said invention whenever he did not
wish to use the same himself, meaning and intending to convey the right to use
or vend a single saw or machine only--the said invention--for, to and in said
mill, and in no other place.
The defendant objected
that the deed showed that the original patent was held by Allen, and that there
was no evidence tending to show any right of the plaintiff in the patent. The court ruled that
the delivery of the patent saw, the use of it by the defendant without
returning it, and the deed tendered, were evidence of a sale of the right to
use the saw, and that the plaintiff might recover, upon the facts proved, for
the sale of such right; to which the defendant excepted.
A verdict was returned for
the plaintiff, which the defendant moves to set aside.
Headnotes
Cushing, for the
defendant.
*2 The plaintiff
claims to recover not only for the machine sold, but also for the patent right,
which by law can pass only by deed. U. S. Statutes, July 4, 1836, ch. 357, sec.
11, "An act to promote the progress of the useful arts," & c. The
plaintiff's deed to the defendant shows that the original patent was issued to
a third person, and the deed of assignment to the plaintiff was not produced,
nor its absence accounted for. There was not even prima facie proof of
the plaintiff's right under the patent.
Wheeler & Faulkner,
for the plaintiff.
The only question
presented by the case is as to the correctness of the ruling, that the delivery
of the saw, the subsequent use of it by the defendant, without objection, and
without returning it, or in any way rescinding
the contract, and the tender of the deed, were competent evidence of the sale
of the right to use the saw. The undertaking of the plaintiff was not to make
an assignment of the patent right, but to convey a machine which included a saw
as a part of it, with a license to use the peculiar kind of saw known as
Allen's. No deed or other writing was necessary or called for at the time of
the sale. The property passed, and the right passed by the delivery, and until
the contrary is shown the presumption is that the plaintiff owned what he sold.
Where the vendee undertakes to recover back money paid for a patent right, on
the ground that the vendor had no such right, if the vendee has not been
disturbed in the use of it, it is for him to prove that the vendor had not the
right. Stevens v. Head, 9 Vt. 174. If the recital in the deed, that
Allen was the patentee, is evidence against the plaintiff as his admission that
he was not the owner of the right, the whole taken together shows that it had
been assigned to him.
SAWYER, J.
The sale of the machine
and the right to use with it one of Allen's patented saws, imported a license
to use the saw. Such license is not an assignment of an interest in the patent,
or a grant of an exclusive right under it to make and use the patented article,
within the meaning of section 11 of the act of congress
of July 4, 1836, (5 Statutes at Large 123) which requires the assignment of a
patent, or of any interest therein, and the grant of an exclusive right under
it to make and use the patented article, to be in writing, and recorded. Gayler
v. Wilder, 10 How. 477. An assignment, within the meaning of the act, is
the transfer of the whole or of an undivided interest in the monopoly conferred
by the letters patent; and a grant is the conveyance of an exclusive right to
make, use, or vend within a designated territory. Either gives to the assignee
or grantee a right or interest in the monopoly, which may be protected by a
suit for its violation. A license by the party claiming the monopoly to use one
of the patented articles, is a mere waiver by him of all claim for damages for
what otherwise would be a violation of his right in the use by the licensee; Wilson
v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646; Troy Factory v. Corning, 14 How. 193; and
it confers no exclusive right or interest under the patent for a violation of
which he may recover damages. If there is implied in such license a covenant of
right and title in the licensor, it is sufficient for this case that the
defendant has introduced no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had no
right or title, or that the use of the saw, in accordance with the license, has
been interrupted. Until the defendant is disturbed in exercising his license by
some party claiming to be the owner of the right under the patent, and whose
right would appear, prima facie, to be violated thereby, he is not in
the situation to call upon the vendor, in an
action for the purchase money agreed to be paid, to establish his title to the
thing sold. Until then he has all he bargained for. If the want of title in his
vendor would avail him in such case as a defence, it is for him to show it. Holden
v. Curtis, 2 N. H. 61; Bartlett v. Holbrook, 1 Gray 114. The
position taken by the counsel for the defendant, that this is shown by the
recital in the plaintiff's deed, that the letters patent were granted to Allen,
is fully answered by the view suggested on the other side, that if this is
evidence against the plaintiff on that point, it is so because it is an
admission made by him, and the admission is qualified by the further recital
that the patent has been assigned to him. It is an admission, then, not that
the plaintiff had no title at the time of the sale, but directly to the
contrary. The defendant has no ground of exception to the ruling of the court,
and consequently there must be
*3 Judgment on
the verdict.
N.H. 1859.
38 N.H. 44
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