Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
JENKINS
v.
ABBOTTS.
June, 1874.
*1 The plaintiff,
by a memorandum in writing, sold to the defendants the right to lay or put down
concrete paving within a certain territory for a term of years, the defendants
agreeing to pay a royalty of eight cents for each square yard of paving so put
down by them. The only right the plaintiff owned was a right under a patent,
which, as a patent, was worthless. Held, that the agreement was without
consideration, and that the plaintiff could not maintain an action against the
defendants to recover the sum agreed to be paid as royalty.
ASSUMPSIT, commenced
December 4, 1872, upon a written agreement made on the fifteenth day of
October, 1870, by which "said Joel Jenkins agrees to let, and the said N.
Abbott & Son agree to lease, for the term of two years from the fifteenth
day of November, 1870, all the right and privilege of laying or putting down
concrete paving in the town of West Roxbury, Mass., in consideration of the sum of eight cents per
square yard royalty, to be paid to the said Joel Jenkins or his assigns, to be
paid on the first Monday of each month for all that has been put down the month
previous to said Monday. Said N. Abbott & Son shall return to said Joel
Jenkins a monthly statement of all persons' names that have received concrete,
with a correct amount of the number of yards to each and every person named
therein. The said Abbott & Son are to carry on the business under the name
and sign of N. Abbott & Son, and furnish everything relating to the
business in the shape of money, labor, stock, and tools, and all expenses
pertaining to the business, without any expense or liability to the said Joel
Jenkins or his assigns. If the business lies idle, and no returns or
compensation made to the said Joel Jenkins for the space of time, to witness,
forty days during the months of May, June, July, August, September, October,
and November of each year, then this contract shall become null and void, and
the said Abbott & Son shall relinquish all claims to the business, and turn
the same over to Joel Jenkins without any expense to him, and forfeit all
rights to work in the same business in the said town of Roxbury for the space
of time mentioned within, viz., two years from date." At the time this
agreement was made, the plaintiff was engaged in laying what was known as
Scrimshaw's patent concrete paving in West Roxbury, and had been engaged in
that business at that place for about one year, having, under date of July 19,
1869, received a conveyance under seal from Charles W. Lyman, Gilbert S. Foster, and Nelson Abbott of all
their right, title, and interest in the above named invention, as secured to
George Scrimshaw, for the towns of West Roxbury and Hyde Park, and paid them
therefor the sum of eleven hundred dollars. Nelson Abbott, one of the above grantors,
became, was, and is the active partner in the firm of N. Abbott & Son, the
defendants in this action, to whom the before recited lease was made. All the
right and title said Jenkins has or ever had was derived from the above named
grantors, which right and title was by him reconveyed by the lease in question,
as to the town of West Roxbury. The Scrimshaw patent, as a patent, is
worthless. The defendants, during the summer of 1871, carried out the
provisions of the lease with full knowledge that said patent was worthless, and
that other persons were doing the same business in said town. During the second
season under said lease, the defendants carried on the business mentioned, but
made no return according to the lease, and paid no royalty according to the
terms of the same, and this suit is brought to recover damages therefor. For
the purposes of this case, and no other, the said parties agree to the above
statement of facts, each reserving the right to go to the jury on any question
of fact by them deemed material.
Headnotes
Morrison, Stanley &
Hiland, for the plaintiff.
Marshall & Chase, for the defendants.
ISAAC W. SMITH, J.
*2 No question of
fraudulent representation is suggested as entering into the contract between
these parties. The only question is, Was there a sufficient consideration for
the promise of the defendants?
It is claimed by the
defendants that the contract is undum factum,--without consideration.
The parties admit that the Scrimshaw patent, as a patent, is worthless. The
plaintiff "let or leased" (whatever that may mean) to the defendants
for a term, the right and privilege of laying or putting down concrete paving
in West Roxbury, in consideration of a royalty of eight cents per square yard,
to be paid for all paving so put down. No mention is made in the lease or
writing that the paving is the Scrimshaw patent, although it is admitted that
that is what was intended. The patent being worthless, the defendants by the
contract acquired no right to do anything that they had not previously a right
to do. The opportunity was open to any and all who chose to embark in the
business, in West Roxbury, of putting down concrete paving.
Earl v. Page, 6 N.
H. 477, seems to be decisive of this case. That was a suit upon a note given
for a shingle machine, and for the exclusive right to use the same in a certain
district, under a patent claimed by the plaintiff, which was void by reason of the non-compliance
by the patentee with the terms of the statute. The maker of the note having
paid the value of the shingle machine, the court held that the remaining
consideration had failed, and that the plaintiff could not recover.
If it was any part of the
agreement that Jenkins was not to engage in the business of laying concrete
paving in West Roxbury during these two years, it would be a good consideration
for the promise of the defendants to him. Perkins v. Clay (Grafton Co.),
post. Does the agreement so provide? The contract does not purport to
grant an exclusive right or license to put down concrete paving. It does not
state that the plaintiff had any right or interest whatever to convey. The only
right he claims to have had was under a patent which he admits was worthless.
Contracts are to be construed most strictly against the grantor; and it is
equally true that contracts in restriction of trade are to be construed
strictly, as being against public policy. No agreement not to engage in the
business of laying such pavements appears from the terms of the contract or
lease, and we are satisfied that the language used does not authorize such an
agreement by inference. If such an agreement was made by parol, it is void by
statute, as being an agreement not to be performed within one year.
Upon the agreed statement
of facts this action cannot be maintained.
Case discharged.
N.H. 1874.