Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
John E. BARNES et al.
v.
NEW HAMPSHIRE KARTING ASSOCIATION, INC. et al.
No. 85-204.
May 12, 1986.
Headnotes
**152 *104
David J. KillKelley, Laconia, on brief and orally, for plaintiffs.
Sulloway Hollis &
Soden, Concord (Edward M. Kaplan on brief and orally, and Robert J. Lanney on
brief), for defendants.
KING, Chief Justice.
The plaintiffs, John E.
and Virginia A. Barnes, sued the New Hampshire Karting Association (NHKA),
David E. Whitesell, Midway Raceway, Inc. d/b/a Bryar Motorsport Park (Bryar),
the World Karting Association (WKA) and International Insurance Company
(International) for damages arising from injuries sustained by John Barnes (Barnes, or the plaintiff) in an
Enduro kart collision at Bryar in 1981.
Defendants Whitesell, NHKA, WKA and Bryar moved for summary judgment,
claiming that the release executed by Barnes barred him from seeking
recovery. Following a hearing, the
Master (Louie C. Elliott, Jr., Esq.) recommended that the defendants'
motion for summary judgment be granted as to all counts asserted by John Barnes
against Whitesell, NHKA, WKA and Bryar. The master recommended denial of the motion for summary judgment
as to the claims asserted by Virginia Barnes and ruled that the release did not
bar claims against International. The
Superior Court (DiClerico, J.) approved the master's recommendations. We affirm.
On August 29, 1981, before
entering the pit area at the Bryar Motorsport Park, John Barnes signed a
"pit pass" containing the release at issue. The pass comprised three parts;
the participant was given the top portion, which stated "THE HOLDER
ACKNOWLEDGES SIGNING WAIVER & RELEASE FROM LIABILITY BEFORE ENTERING TRACK
AREA." The middle section, which
each participant was required to sign in order to receive a number for the
race, provided:
"RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
IN CONSIDERATION of being permitted to enter for any purpose any
RESTRICTED AREA (herein defined as including but not limited to, the racing
surface, pit areas, infield, burn out area, approach area, shut down area, and
all walkways, concessions and other areas appurtenant to *105 any area
where any activity related to the event shall
take place), or being permitted to compete, officiate, observe, work for, or
for any purpose participate in any way in the event, EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED
...
1. HEREBY RELEASES,
WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND COVENANTS NOT **153 TO SUE ... from all liability
to the undersigned ... for any and all loss or damage, and any claim or demands
therefor on account of injury to the person or property or resulting in death
of the undersigned, whether caused by the negligence of the releases [sic] or
otherwise while the undersigned is in or upon the restricted area, and/or
competing, officiating in, observing, working for, or for any purpose
participating in the event;
* * *
3. HEREBY ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND RISK OF BODILY
INJURY, DEATH OR PROPERTY DAMAGE due to the negligence of releasees or
otherwise while in or upon the restricted area and/or while competing,
officiating, observing, or working for or for any purpose participating in the
event.
EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED expressly acknowledges and agrees that the
activities of the event are very dangerous and involve the risk of serious
injury and/or death and/or property damage....
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ AND VOLUNTARILY SIGNS THE RELEASE AND
WAIVER OF LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT, and further agrees that no oral
representations, statements of inducements [sic] apart from the foregoing written agreement have been made."
The master found that
Barnes did not read the release portion before signing the pit pass on this
occasion or on the previous occasions he had raced at the track. Nonetheless, Barnes admitted that he had
read the top portion and understood that the document he was signing was "[s]ome
sort of waiver or release."
Barnes proceeded to take a
practice run. As he rounded a blind
turn, his kart collided with a disabled kart on the track. No flagman was present to warn drivers of
hazards out of view beyond that turn.
John Barnes and his wife, Virginia, sued the defendants for injuries and
loss of consortium, respectively, alleging liability for ordinary and gross
negligence.
*106 The question
presented for review is whether the plaintiff's causes of action are barred by
the release and waiver of liability and indemnity agreement he signed. Barnes contends that the release does not
bar his claims because it violates public policy, is ambiguous, and does not
apply to risks not inherent in the sport, which were not within the
contemplation of the parties. He further
argues that the release does not cover gross negligence, and that it is void
because it involves an illegal tying arrangement.
[1]
Exculpatory agreements call into conflict two tenets of the law. First, a party should be liable for the
consequences of the negligent breach of a duty owed another. As this court stated in a recent case
involving an amusement ride accident, the
owner of a place of public amusement "must exercise that degree ofcare
which, under the same or similar circumstances, would be exercised by an
ordinarily careful or prudent individual." Siciliano v. Capitol City
Shows, Inc., 124 N.H. 719, 730, 475 A.2d 19, 25 (1984). Failure to do so will result in liability
for injuries proximately caused by the breach of duty.
[2][3] Contraposed against this basic rule of tort law
is the principle that, as a matter of efficiency and freedom of choice, parties
should be able to contract freely about their affairs. ABA Special Committee on the Tort Liability
System, Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury:
The Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in American
Tort Law § 5-27 (Nov.1984); Morrow
v. Auto Championship Racing Ass'n, Inc., 8 Ill.App.3d 682, 685, 291 N.E.2d
30, 32 (1972). Under this rule,
parties may bargain for various levels of risk and benefit as they see
fit. Thus, a plaintiff may agree in
advance that the defendant has no legal duty toward him and thereby assume the
risk of injury arising from the defendant's conduct. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, **154
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §
68, at 480- 81 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter cited as Prosser & Keeton).
[4][5] In New Hampshire, exculpatory contracts are
generally prohibited. A defendant
seeking to avoid liability must show that the exculpatory agreement does not
contravene public policy; i.e.,
that no special relationship existed between
the parties and that there was no other disparity in bargaining power. Where the defendant is a common carrier,
innkeeper or public utility, or is otherwise charged with a duty of public
service, the defendant cannot by contract rid itself of its obligation of
reasonable care. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 496B, comment g (1965);
Restatement of Contracts § 575
(1932); see Wessman v. Railroad,
84 N.H. 475, 152 A. 476 (1930).
[6]
*107 Courts have refused to uphold such agreements because one party is
at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power. Prosser & Keeton, supra § 68, at 482.
"The disparity in bargaining power may arise from the
defendant's monopoly of a particular field of service, from the generality of
use of contract clauses insisting upon assumption of risk by all those engaged
in such a field, so that the plaintiff has no alternative possibility of obtaining
the service without the clause; or it
may arise from the exigencies of the needs of the plaintiff himself, which
leave him no reasonable alternative to the acceptance of the offered
terms."
Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 496B, comment j (1965). Cf. Cailler v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co., 117 N.H. 915, 919, 379 A.2d 1253, 1256 (1977). Where there is a
disparity in bargaining power, the plaintiff may not be deemed to have freely
chosen to enter into the contract;
accordingly, courts refuse to enforce
the agreement. See Shaer Shoe
Corporation v. Granite State Alarm, Inc., 110 N.H. 132, 135, 262 A.2d 285,
287 (1970).
[7][8] Once an exculpatory agreement is found
unobjectionable as a matter of public policy, it will be upheld only if it
appears that the plaintiff understood the import of the agreement or that a
reasonable person in his position would have known of the exculpatory
provision. Furthermore, the
plaintiff's claims must have been within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of the execution of the agreement.
Arnold v. Shawano County Agr. Society, 106 Wis.2d 464, 470, 317
N.W.2d 161, 164 (1982), aff'd, 111 Wis.2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773
(1983). The parties need not, however,
have contemplated the precise occurrence that resulted in the plaintiff's
injuries. They may adopt language to
cover a broad range of accidents, as they did in this case by specifying
injuries involving negligence on the part of the defendants.
[9]
Nonetheless, since the terms of the contract are strictly construed against the
defendant, the contract must clearly state that the defendant is not responsible
for the consequences of his negligence.
Prosser & Keeton, supra §
68, at 483-84. As long as the
language of the release clearly and specifically indicates the intent to
release the defendant from liability for personal injury caused by the defendant's
negligence, the agreement will be upheld.
Cf. Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Brown Co., 120 N.H. 620,
623, 419 A.2d 1111, 1113 (1980).
[10] *108 As a preliminary
matter, we note that the plaintiff's failure to read the entire release does
not preclude enforcement of the agreement. Barnes testified that he was in a
line of people waiting to pay money and obtain numbers for the race and that
the workers wanted to "get [them] on [their] way." There was no evidence, however, that Barnes
was denied the opportunity to read the body of the release. "[H]aving failed to avail himself of that
opportunity, yet gaining the admission to which his signature was a condition
precedent, he cannot now complain that he had no notice of the import of the
paper ... he signed." Lee v.
Allied Sports Associates, Inc., 349 Mass. 544, 550, 209 N.E.2d 329, 332
(1965).
**155 [11] With these principles in mind, we now
consider whether the release bars the plaintiff's claims in this case. The first question is whether the release
is contrary to public policy. The
defendants do not fall within any of the commonly-recognized classes of persons
charged with a duty of public service.
The record indicates that the 1981 Enduro kart races at Bryar were
organized by the NHKA, which is associated with the WKA and which manages its
races in accordance with WKA rules and regulations. Although the defendants serve a segment of the public, we cannot
say that Enduro kart racing is affected with a public interest. Provision of racing facilities is not a
service of great importance to the public, nor is racing a matter of practical
necessity. Winterstein v. Wilcom,
16 Md.App. 130, 138, 293 A.2d 821, 825 (1972).
Moreover, there was no
substantial disparity in bargaining power among the parties, despite the fact
that Barnes was required to sign the release in order to use the racetrack. The plaintiff was under no physical or
economic compulsion to sign the release.
Since the defendants' service is not an essential one, the defendants
had no advantage of bargaining strength over Barnes or others who sought to
participate in Enduro kart racing. Cailler,
117 N.H. at 919, 379 A.2d at 1256; Schlessman
v. Henson, 83 Ill.2d 82, 86- 87, 46 Ill.Dec. 139, 141, 413 N.E.2d 1252,
1254 (1980). Barnes wished to compete
and voluntarily agreed not to hold others liable for his injuries. Hence, we
conclude that the release was not barred by public policy and may be upheld.
The plaintiff cites a
number of cases from other jurisdictions that hold on public policy grounds
that an exculpatory agreement does not release defendants from liability for
gross negligence. These cases are
inapposite because New Hampshire law does not distinguish causes of action
based on ordinary and gross negligence.
"[T]he doctrine of definitive degrees of negligence is not
recognized as a part of our common law...." Lee v. Chamberlin, 84 N.H. 182, *109 188, 148 A.
466, 469 (1929). The plaintiff
advances no reasons for abandoning this rule and we decline to create an
exception to allow him to pursue his claims of gross negligence.
[12] We now examine the language
of the release to determine the extent of its coverage. Barnes contends that the accident did not
occur in a "restricted area" because, although he was on the racing
surface, the area did not become restricted until numbers were given and
racing had begun, and he was merely taking a practice lap at the time of the
accident. In interpreting this
contract, we will give language used by the parties its common meaning, Murphy
v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611-12, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980), and
will give the contract itself the meaning that would be attached to it by a
reasonable person. Kilroe v. Troast,
117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977).
The first paragraph of the
release states that the release is given "IN CONSIDERATION of being
permitted to enter for any purpose any RESTRICTED AREA ... or being permitted
to compete ... or for any purpose participate in any way in the event...." The agreement defines "restricted
area" as including "the racing surface, pit areas, infield, burn out
area, approach area, shut down area, and all walkways, concessions and other
areas appurtenant to any area where any activity related to the event shall
take place." Finally, the agreement states that the defendants are
released "from all liability to the undersigned ... whether caused by the
negligence of the releases [sic] or otherwise while the undersigned is in or
upon the restricted area, and/or competing ... or for any purpose participating
in the event."
We find that participation in practice laps on the racing surface
comes within the terms of the release.
The restricted areas are defined in terms of physical spaces, not in
terms of function, and the reference to "enter[ing] for any purpose"
contemplates that the racing surface is a restricted area **156 during
practice runs and during the actual race.
Although the plaintiff testified that he had practiced on occasion without
signing a release, he signed the release prior to taking a practice lap on the
day in question. One can contemplate
that racers are exposed to a variety of hazards while in the racing arena
regardless of whether the actual race is taking place. We believe that the practice run taken by
Barnes in preparation for the race later that day may reasonably be construed
as part of "participat[ion] in the event." We therefore uphold the master's conclusion that the language of
the agreement was not ambiguous and that the release applied to practice laps.
[13]
*110 Barnes contends that the release is unenforceable because it
involves an illegal tying arrangement.
He asserts that, in violation of RSA 417:4, XIII, the pit pass and
certain insurance coverage were offered at a single price, without an option to
take one "product" and not the other. RSA 417:4, XIII provides that
it is an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act and
practice in the business of insurance to:
"Arrang[e] or participat[e] in any plan to offer or effect in
this state as an inducement to the purchase
or rental by the public of any property or services, any insurance for which
there is no separate charge to the insured...."
Although it appears that
no separate charge was made for the insurance, we find that the insurance was
not offered as an inducement to the purchase of the pit pass or the use of the
Bryar Motorsport Park.
Affirmed.
All concurred.
N.H.,1986.
509 A.2d 151, 128 N.H. 102
END OF DOCUMENT