Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
Dennis S. ROBERTS
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
No. 92-703.
June 7, 1994.
Rehearing Denied July 28, 1994.
Headnotes
**957 *534
Wadleigh, Starr, Peters, Dunn & Chiesa, Manchester (Robert E. Murphy, Jr.,
on the brief and orally, and Kathleen N. Sullivan on the brief), for plaintiff.
Bingham, Dana & Gould,
Boston, MA (Daniel L. Goldberg on the brief and orally, and Lawrence S. Buonomo
on the brief), and Brown, Olson & Wilson, Concord (Howard B. Myers on the
brief), for defendant.
THAYER, Justice.
The plaintiff, Dennis S.
Roberts, initially alleged six claims against the
defendant, General Motors Corporation (GMC), for breach of contract; violation
of RSA chapter 357-C, which regulates business practices between motor vehicle
manufacturers, distributors and dealers (the Dealership Act); tortious
interference with contractual relations;
tortious interference with advantageous relations; commission of unfair or deceptive acts or
practices; and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Superior Court (McHugh, J.)
granted summary judgment to the defendant on all but the last claim, which **958
the plaintiff then voluntarily nonsuited.
The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in
ruling: (1) that a prospective
franchisee has no standing to sue under either the Dealership Act or RSA
chapter 358-A, the Consumer Protection Act;
and (2) that the facts did not support either a claim for tortious
interference with his contractual rights or a claim for breach of contract as a
third party beneficiary to GMC's dealership agreement with Wallace Chevrolet. We affirm.
Robert Wallace was the
owner of the GMC franchised dealership, Wallace Chevrolet, Inc., in
Hampton. In 1987, Wallace Chevrolet
notified GMC that it had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to
purchase its assets. Under the terms of the dealership agreement between GMC
and Wallace Chevrolet, Wallace Chevrolet could not transfer the franchise
absent GMC's consent, which consent could not be withheld arbitrarily. GMC provided the plaintiff with application
*535 materials and agreed to consider him as the proposed transferee, but told Wallace that it preferred a
different candidate to assume the dealership, Edward Byrnes, president of
Byrnes Chevrolet.
During the summer of 1987,
while it considered the plaintiff's application, GMC decided to designate
Hampton as a "minority point," or minority-owned dealership. At that time, Edward Byrnes proposed that
one of his employees, James Noble, who is a member of a minority group, be
considered as a candidate. In August,
a GMC representative met with Noble to provide him with information and
application materials. At no time did
GMC inform the plaintiff that it intended to designate Hampton as a minority
point.
On September 18, GMC
notified Wallace Chevrolet that it would exercise its right of first refusal as
permitted by the dealership agreement, and that it would purchase Wallace
Chevrolet's dealership for the price set forth in the purchase agreement
between Wallace Chevrolet and the plaintiff.
On September 21, GMC told the plaintiff that although his application
was complete and satisfactory, General Motors had decided to exercise its right
of first refusal and not grant the plaintiff the Hampton franchise. Ultimately, the dealership was sold to
Coastal Chevrolet, fifteen percent of the stock of which was owned by its
president, Noble. The instant suit
resulted from the plaintiff's disappointed expectations.
Under RSA 491:8-a, III
(1983), summary judgment is appropriate where, after considering all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, the trial court determines that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Horse Pond Fish & Game Club v.
Cormier, 133 N.H. 648, 653, 581 A.2d 478, 481 (1990). While the summary judgment procedure is
designed to save time, expense, and effort, it is not intended to cut off
deserving litigants from their day in court.
Coburn v. First Equity Associates, 116 N.H. 522, 524, 363 A.2d
402, 404 (1976).
[1]
The plaintiff first contends that the trial court erroneously denied him
standing to sue under the Dealership Act, RSA ch. 357-C (1984 &
Supp.1993). In evaluating whether a
party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the plaintiff suffered a legal
injury against which the law was designed to protect. See State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 466, 464 A.2d 268,
273-74 (1983). Therefore, "[t]he
issue before us is a matter of statutory construction; accordingly, we must begin our analysis by
considering the plain meaning of the words of the *536
statute." Gilmore v. Bradgate
Associates, 135 N.H. 234, 237, 604 A.2d 555, 556 (1992). In so doing, we will focus on the statute
as a whole, not on isolated words or phrases.
N.H. Div. of Human Services v. Hahn, 133 N.H. 776, 778, 584 A.2d
775, 776 (1990); Town of Northampton v. Sanderson, 131 N.H. 614, 622,
557 A.2d 643, 648 (1989).
[2][3] The statute conveys standing upon "any
person who is injured in his business or
property by a violation of this chapter."
RSA 357-C:12, II (1984).
According to the parties' arguments, this provision is susceptible to
two very different interpretations.
The plaintiff argues that the statute on its face provides a remedy to
"any person" injured, and thus must be broadly construed. GMC counters that the statute must be read **959
as a whole, and more particularly that the provisions upon which the plaintiff
bases his claims, RSA 357-C:3, I, III(i), and III(n), are clearly designed not
to protect the plaintiff, but rather to protect existing motor vehicle dealers
from oppressive conduct.
We find GMC's argument to
be more persuasive. While we agree
with the plaintiff that the legislature's use of the word "any"
generally evidences that a statute should include a broad array of potential
plaintiffs, Gilmore, 135 N.H. at 234, 604 A.2d at 557; DeCato Brothers, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Credit Corp., 129 N.H. 504, 507, 529 A.2d 952, 954 (1987), here the
legislature specifically limited standing to those injured in business or
property. Thus, it is a person's
"business or property" interest that the statute seeks to protect.
Further, the standing
provision must not be isolated from the rest of the statute, but rather must be
read in conjunction with the statute as a whole. Hahn, 133 N.H. at 778,
584 A.2d at 776. Chapter 357-C does
contain provisions protecting automobile consumers, see, e.g., RSA
357-C:3, IV; hence, its purpose in part is to
protect the "public interest and welfare." Laws 1981, 477:1. Primarily, however, chapter 357-C is a
comprehensive statute governing the relationships between automobile manufacturers
and their dealers. The clear intent of
the non-consumer-oriented provisions is to protect the investment and property
interests of those who are already dealers.
These dealer-protection provisions include, inter alia, those
provisions upon which the plaintiff relies.
RSA 357-C:3, III(i), for example, states that a manufacturer may not
"[p]revent or attempt to prevent any motor vehicle dealer or
any officer, partner or stockholder of any motor vehicle *537 dealer
from transferring any part of the interest of any of them to any other person;
provided, however, that no dealer ... shall have the right to sell, transfer or
assign the franchise or power of management or control without the consent of
the manufacturer or distributor unless such consent is unreasonably withheld.
Failure to respond within 60 days of receipt of a written request for consent
to a sale, transfer or assignment shall be deemed consent to a request."
RSA 357-C: 3, III(n) declares that a manufacturer may
not
"[i]mpose unreasonable restrictions on the motor vehicle dealer
or franchisee relative to transfer, sale, right to renew, termination,
discipline, noncompetition covenants, site-contract, right of first refusal to
purchase, option to purchase, compliance with subjective standards, or
assertion of legal or equitable rights."
The statute, taken as a
whole, does not include the plaintiff as a person who can claim injury under
its terms. Nothing in chapter 357-C
prohibits the exercise of a right of first refusal on the part of a
franchisor. Nor does the statutory
language suggest an intent by the legislature to limit or regulate a
franchisor's discretion to select new dealers. The plaintiff has no independent right under the statute to be
approved as a GMC franchisee, and he cannot stand upon the rights of Wallace
Chevrolet in order to gain standing under the statute. Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 228
(1st Cir.1984); Flynn, 123 N.H. at 466, 464 A.2d at 273.
We note additionally that
the great majority of other States have construed their dealership statutes to
exclude claims such as the instant one.
See, e.g., Knauz v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 720 F.Supp.
1327, 1329 (N.D.Ill.1989); Statewide
Rent-A-Car v. Subaru of America, 704 F.Supp. 183, 185 (D.Mont.1988); Beard Motors v. Toyota Motor
Distributors, Inc., 395 Mass. 428, 433, 480 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1985); Tynan v. General Motors Corp., 248
N.J.Super. 654, 591 A.2d 1024, 1028-30 (1991), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 127 N.J. 269, 604 A.2d 99 (1992). In Beard Motors, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts construed Mass.Gen.L. ch. 93B.
Although not a mirror image, RSA chapter 357-C is a substantial
counterpart of the Massachusetts statute, in the same way that RSA chapter
358-A resembles Mass.Gen.L. ch. 93A. New Hampshire Auto Dealers v. General
Motors Corp., 620 F.Supp. 1150, 1159 (D.N.H.1985). The Massachusetts statute provides a remedy
to "any franchisee or motor vehicle dealer," Beard Motors, 395
Mass. at 431, 480 N.E.2d **960 at 305, and *538 thus is more
limited on its face than its New Hampshire counterpart. The court in Beard Motors was faced
with a plaintiff who was an automobile dealer, and within the technical
parameters of the standing requirement.
The court recognized, however, that
"not every party who can claim an injury as a result of
violations of a statute or regulation has standing to bring an action
thereunder. This is true even when a
literal reading of the statute, without regard to the Legislature's purpose in
enacting it, would appear to provide a broader grant of standing.... The scope of the grant of authority to bring
an action for violation of [the statute] must be determined with reference to
the context of the subject matter of the statute."
Id. The court stated that the statute was
enacted in "recognition of the potentially oppressive power of automobile
manufacturers and distributors in relation to their affiliated dealers,"
and thus while it protected current dealers from injuries incurred as a result
of their inequality of bargaining power, it did not protect dealer applicants
against "the loss of anticipated profits from the sale of [automobiles]
and from capital appreciation in the value of the [automobile] dealership, due
to [a plaintiff's] inability to obtain the
... franchise." Id. at 433,
480 N.E.2d at 306. This reasoning
additionally bolsters our reading of our own dealership statute to exclude
claims such as that made by the plaintiff in this case. His claim based upon this statute was
properly dismissed by the trial court.
[4][5] The plaintiff next argues that the trial court
erred in finding that the Consumer Protection Act, RSA ch. 358-A (1984 &
Supp.1993), did not apply to his claim.
The Consumer Protection Act is a comprehensive statute whose language
indicates that it should be given broad sweep. See Gilmore, 135 N.H. at 238, 604 A.2d at 557. Despite its broad language, however, it is
not unlimited in scope. RSA 358-A:2
(1984 & Supp.1993) lists thirteen representative categories of unlawful
acts or practices, each dealing with transactions for the provision of goods or
services to consumers. None encompass
the type of transaction that the plaintiff sought, but was denied, with
GMC. While the act itself states that
it is not limited only to these specific transactions, see RSA 358-A:2,
we agree with the Massachusetts Appeals Court that "[r]ules of statutory
construction lead us to conclude ... that the phrase 'including but not limited
to,' which precedes the specification, limits the applicability of [the
Consumer Protection Act] to those types of [acts] therein
particularized." Mahoney *539
v. Baldwin, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 778, 779-80,543 N.E.2d 435, 436, review
denied, 406 Mass. 1102, 546 N.E.2d 375 (1989); see L & R Prebuilt Homes v. New England Allbank For Sav., 783 F.Supp. 11, 15
(D.N.H.1992). In addition, the statute
states that its interpretation should be guided by the construction given to
the analogous Federal Trade Commission Act, found in relevant part at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (1982). See RSA 358-A:13 (1984). We have not found any cases decided under
that statute allowing a claim such as that made by the plaintiff. In fact, in analogous refusal-to-deal cases,
the Federal Trade Commission and other courts have regularly found the federal
statute inapplicable. See In re Sun
Electric Corp., 69 F.T.C. 571, 594 (1966) ( "[N]o doubt an automobile
dealer selling Ramblers might be 'injured'--in the sense of losing potential
profit--if he were denied a Chevrolet franchise by General Motors. But it certainly does not follow that GM's
denial to him of a Chevrolet franchise is unlawful."); PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper
Co., 366 Mass. 593, 599, 321 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1975) ("Our careful
examination of the Federal acts and their interpretation has led us to the
conclusion that a refusal to deal, without a showing of monopolistic purpose or
concerted effort to hinder free trade, is not an unfair trade practice.").
[6]
The plaintiff next argues that the trial court erroneously rejected his claim
that GMC tortiously interfered with his contractual relationship with Wallace
Chevrolet. In order to bring a claim
for tortious interference, the plaintiff must show that he had a contractual
relationship with Wallace Chevrolet of which GMC was aware; that GMC wrongfully induced Wallace Chevrolet to breach that contract; and that the damages **961 claimed
were proximately caused by that interference.
Montrone v. Maxfield, 122 N.H. 724, 726, 449 A.2d 1216, 1217
(1982). The trial court applied the Montrone
test, and while it found that the plaintiff could show a contractual
relationship between himself and Wallace Chevrolet of which GMC was aware, it
found that the plaintiff could not meet the rest of the test. His sole claim
for damages for tortious interference was for his lost opportunity to become a
GMC franchisee. The trial court found
that
"[u]nder no theory can the plaintiff be said to have had any
right to become a General Motors dealer.
General Motors' dealer contracts, which naturally predate any contract
between an existing dealer and an interested third party purchaser, clearly
provide for a right of first refusal.
There is no *540 dispute here that Roberts knew that fact at the
inception of his purchase discussions with Wallace."
Thus, the trial court
found that GMC had properly exercised its right of first refusal to prevent
Wallace Chevrolet from transferring the franchise to the plaintiff.
We must determine whether
the plaintiff, as a dealer applicant, can legally assert a claim of tortious
interference against GMC for its refusal to approve the transfer of the
franchise. Only improper
interference is deemed tortious in New Hampshire. In Montrone, the entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who brought a tortious interference
claim against a real estate broker was affirmed because the plaintiff was
unable to "create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendants
wrongfully induced the seller to breach any agreement he may have had with the
plaintiff." Id. at 726, 449
A.2d at 1217. The real estate agent
sued had acted within the purview of his contract with the seller of the
property, and thus could not be sued by the disappointed buyer for tortious
interference. Id.; see Emery v. Merrimack Valley Wood Products,
Inc., 701 F.2d 985, 988-89 (1st Cir.1983) (applying New Hampshire
law). In the instant case, GMC argues
that it too acted within the purview of its contractual rights in exercising
its right of first refusal, and therefore that Roberts can show no wrongful
interference resulting in damages.
Section 767 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1977) sets forth a number of factors to be considered in
determining whether an intentional interference with a contractual relationship
will be considered tortious:
"In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally
interfering with a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is
improper or not, consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of
the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
interference and
*541 (g) the relations between the parties."
Restatement (Second) of
Torts, supra § 767. Applicable here is the narrow situation set
forth in section 767(d), and fleshed out in section 773:
"One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected
interest of his own ... intentionally causes a third person not to perform an
existing contract or enter into a prospective contractual relation with another
does not interfere improperly with the other's relation if the actor believes
that his interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of
the contract or transaction."
Id. § 773.
We will thus analyze the plaintiff's claim in light of whether in
interfering with the contract GMC asserted a legally protected interest that
GMC believed may have been impaired or destroyed by the performance of the
contract between the plaintiff and Wallace Chevrolet.
[7]
GMC, like any other franchisor, has a legitimate financial interest in the
identity and ability of its franchisees.
See, e.g., Statewide Rent-A- Car, Inc., 704 F.Supp. at 186; Tynan v. General Motors Corp., 248
N.J.Super. **962 654, 591 A.2d 1024, 1033 (A.D.1991). It provided for the protection of this interest in the
right-of-first-refusal clause in its dealership agreement with Wallace
Chevrolet, which type of clause we have recognized and enforced. See, e.g., Smith v. Wedgewood Builders
Corp., 134 N.H. 125, 131, 590 A.2d 186, 189 (1991); Baker v. McCarthy, 122 N.H. 171,
176-77, 443 A.2d 138, 141-42 (1982).
Other courts have
recognized a franchisor's legitimate interest in selecting its
franchisees. In Tynan v. General
Motors Corp., a New Jersey court found that absent protection under the New
Jersey dealership statute for a dealer applicant, there would exist no
protection for him under the law of tortious interference. Tynan, 591 A.2d at 1034. Similarly, the right of the franchisor to
select its franchisees has been held to preclude an action by the disappointed
prospective transferee for tortious interference. Statewide Rent-A-Car,
Inc., 704 F.Supp. at 186.
The plaintiff argues that
GMC's conduct was improper because it did not strictly abide by the terms of
its contract with Wallace or with the terms of the Dealership Act. The plaintiff, however, had no statutory
right to become a franchisee or to enforce the provisions of the Dealership
Act, nor was he an intended beneficiary able to enforce the dealership
agreement as a third party beneficiary.
He *542 thus has no right to complain on those grounds. We conclude that the plaintiff's claim for
intentional interference with contractual relations was properly denied by the
trial court.
[8][9]
The plaintiff lastly argues that the trial court erred in denying him status as
a third-party beneficiary of the dealership agreement between GMC and Wallace
Chevrolet. The dealership agreement
provides that Michigan law governs any controversies arising thereunder. Cf. Allied Adjustment Serv. v. Heney,
125 N.H. 698, 700, 484 A.2d 1189, 1191 (1984) (parties to contract may choose
law of particular jurisdiction to govern their affairs if jurisdiction has
significant relationship to the contract). In Michigan, third-party beneficiary
law is controlled by a statute, which provides in relevant part:
"Any person for whose benefit a promise is made by way of
contract ... has the same right to enforce said promise that he would have had
if the said promise had been made directly to him as the promisee.
(1) A promise shall be construed to have been made for the benefit
of a person whenever the promisor of said promise has undertaken to give or to
do or refrain from doing something directly to or for said person."
Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.1405 (1981).
The Michigan courts
interpret this statute to require a showing that the plaintiff was an intended
beneficiary of the contract, not merely an incidental beneficiary:
"Where the contract is primarily for the benefit of the
parties thereto, the mere fact that a third person would be incidentally
benefitted does not give that third person
the right to recover for its breach."
Alden State Bank v. Old
Kent Bank, 180 Mich.App. 40, 44, 446 N.W.2d 599, 602 (1989). To differentiate between intended and
incidental beneficiaries, the courts apply an objective test of whether in the
contract itself the defendant made "a promise to do something directly to
or for the [third party beneficiary]."
Frick v. Patrick, 165 Mich.App. 689, 694-95, 419 N.W.2d 55, 58
(1988). In Alden State Bank,
the court determined that a payee on a check wrongfully refused by the drawee
bank did not have standing as a third party beneficiary because the contract
between the bank and the drawer of the check only incidentally benefitted the
payees of checks drawn. Alden State
Bank, 180 Mich.App. at 45, 446 N.W.2d at 602. Similarly, *543 the Frick court determined that
although certain mentally retarded individuals would have benefitted from a
lease between the State and a property owner made specifically for a home for
mentally retarded citizens, the benefit conferred on the individuals was
incidental rather than intended. Frick,
165 Mich.App. at 695, 419 N.W.2d at 58;
see also Rieth-Riley Const. v. Department of Transp., 136
Mich.App. 425, 357 N.W.2d 62 (1984).
The contract involved in
this case, like those in Alden State Bank and Frick, did provide some benefit to the plaintiff. Further, **963 while GMC would be
hard-pressed to argue that it did not know that one such as the plaintiff might
at some time be benefitted by its contract with Wallace Chevrolet, this benefit is no more direct than
that of the payee on the check in Alden State Bank. GMC made no promises directly to or for the
benefit of the plaintiff as opposed to Wallace Chevrolet. Because we determine that any benefit to
the plaintiff under the contract between GMC and Wallace Chevrolet was
incidental, the plaintiff can make no third-party beneficiary claim under
Michigan law.
Affirmed.
All concurred.
N.H.,1994.
643 A.2d 956, 138 N.H. 532
END OF DOCUMENT