1. This summer I was attracted to an article written by Francis Fukuyama, a high State Dept. official.

2. Let me quote some of its passages:

3. I think we're all happy with the evolution of democracy in the world but I think we would all agree that Fukuyama's trivialization of economic activity is unfortunate. Especially since the freedom to conduct one's own business is a fundmental element of democracy. ~~Clearly Fukuyama over emphasizes the predictability of history and totally ignores the fact that sometime weakness and irrationality of human Nature can frustrate the fulfillment of human needs even in a democracy.~~

4. But in a backhanded way he grudgingly suggests that for the time being people concerned with the economy are center stage and the needs of the world are in their hands.

5. In this context the services provided by this group will grow increasingly important as they fall within Fukuyama's New world of "economic calculation and endless solving of technical problems".

6. Indeed, if you're not convinced of your relevancy by Fukuyama, I have another article to persuade.

7. This one is called, "Sometimes the best solution is In Someone Else's Lab". Here the author says that, "In the near future, there will be a greatly expanded need for a New player in the product-development game — " The international technology facilitator."

8. By now you are wondering what Fukuyama has to do with databases?

9. I would suggest that what Fukuyama is actually observing is the decentralization of the authorities maintained within central bureaucracy's worldwide — not only in the East but in the West as well — for failure to do successfully the very thing he now condemns us to — "economic calculation".

10. Clearly Fukuyama over emphasizes the predictability of history and totally ignores the fact that sometime weakness and irrationality of human nature can frustate the fulfillment of human needs even in a democracy. This includes the possible recapture of authorities by standing bureaucracies.

11. That means organized efforts like this to heighten a technology manager ability to perform and maintain decentralized authority. To me one of the most pressing problems is the development of more comprehensive ~~technology~~ databases of technology disclosures from multiple creating organizations seeking to grant rights to their technology in exchange for industry support. The absence of such databases in the private sector has already ~~[illegible]~~ been commented on by government policy makers. ~~[illegible]~~ ~~Critical Mass~~. Databases make sense — critical mass

12. A number of companies do indeed provide important database ~~useful~~ services ~~to informatio technology from segments of the~~ but in most part serve only selected segments of the technology community.

12. Some examples are:

Dr. Dronkowitz & Assoc. — Fl.
Lloyd Patterson, International — Fl.
Nerac — Conn.
Technology Catalysts Wash. D.C.
Technical Insights Englewood, N.J.
Techstant International N.Y.
BBI — Cal.
Regis McKenna — Cal.
BEST — Cuthbertmill — G.B.

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THE END OF HISTORY?

As Our Mad Century Closes, We Find the Universal State

A lively debate among intellectuals here and abroad has greeted an essay that appears in the current issue of The National Interest, a Washington-based quarterly. Francis Fukuyama's argument that history has reached its ideological end is a topic of controversy from New York to London to Sydney, and is scheduled to appear in translation in Paris and Rome this fall. Below is an adaptation of the original piece. Fukuyama is deputy director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. The views in his essay do not represent those of the U.S. government.

By Francis Fukuyama

IN WATCHING the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something fundamental has happened in world history. The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that "peace" seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world. But what we may in fact be witnessing is not just the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the emergence of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. Borrowing the vocabulary of Hegel and Marx, it may be the end of history.

The 20th century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war. But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.

The end of history does not mean there will no longer be international events to chronicle, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and as of yet is incomplete in the real or material world. But there are pow-

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JOHN PACK FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

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erful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.

In the past century, there have been two major challenges to liberalism: fascism and communism. Fascism saw the political weakness, anomie and lack of community in the West as fundamental contradictions of liberalism that could only be resolved by a strong state that forged a new "people." But fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. Expansionist ultranationalism, with its promise of unending conflict leading to disastrous defeat, was no longer viable either as a political movement or as an idea.

Communism's challenge was far more serious. Marx asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental and unresolvable contradiction, that between capital and labor, the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely, the class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West. The egalitarianism of modern America represents the essential achievement of the classless society envisioned by Marx. The economic inequalities that persist and in some cases have grown worse are not an outgrowth of the legal and social structure of our society but are the legacy of a preliberal past. As a result of the receding of the class issue, the appeal of communism in the Western world, it is safe to say, is lower today than at any time since the end of World War I.

One may argue that the socialist alternative was never terribly plausible for the North Atlantic world and was sustained for the last several decades by its success elsewhere. But it is precisely in the non-European world that one is most struck by the occurrence of major ideological transformations.

Surely the most remarkable changes have occurred in Asia. Western capitalism and liberal democracy were transplanted to Japan following the defeat of fascism there. Though Japanese industry and politics are very different from those in the West, the very fact that the essential elements of economic and political liberalism have been so successfully grafted onto uniquely Japanese traditions and institutions guarantees their survival in the long run. More important is the contribution Japan has made in turn to world history by following in the footsteps of the United States to create a truly universal consumer culture, both the symbol and the underpinning of the universal homogenous state.

The success of the other newly industrializing countries in Asia is by now a familiar story. What is important from a Hegelian standpoint is that political liberalism developed in parallel with economic liberalism in unexpected places from South Korea to the Philippines.

But the power of the liberal idea would seem much less impressive if it had not infected the largest and oldest culture in Asia, China. In the past 15 years Marxism-Leninism has been almost totally discredited as an economic system, and the post-crackdown resurgance of ideological language now sounds positively archaic. Economic reform was accompanied by enormous political and intellectual ferment that threw into question fundamental tenets of Chinese socialism. The tragic repression in Tiananmen Square this summer was in a way less remarkable than the massive prodemocracy movement that brought it on, and is likely to prove less enduring.

What is important about China from the standpoint of world history is that the People's Republic of China can no longer act as a beacon for illiberal forces around the world, whether guerrillas or middle-class students. Maoism, rather than being the pattern for Asia's future, became an anachronism.

It is the developments in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev which have driven the final nail into Marxism-Leninism's coffin, however. Although formal institutions are only now beginning to change, what has happened in the realm of ideas is a revolutionary assault on the most fundamental principles of Stalinism, and their replacement by principles which do not amount to liberalism per se, but whose only connecting thread is liberalism.

The Soviet Union could in no way be described as a liberal or democratic country now, nor is it likely to become one in the near future. But at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society. And Gorbachev, despite his tactical invocations of Lenin, has permitted people to say what they had privately understood for years: that the magical incantations of Marxism-Leninism were nonsense, that Soviet socialism was not superior to the West in any respect but was in fact a monumental failure.

Are there any other ideological competitors to liberalism? Two possibilities suggest themselves: religion and nationalism. The rise of religious fundamentalism in recent years attests to a broad unhappiness with the spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist societies. Yet while the emptiness at the core of liberalism is certainly a defect in the ideology, it may not be resolvable through politics. Modern liberalism was a consequence of the weakness of religiously-based societies which could not provide even minimal peace and stability, much less the good life. In the contemporary world only Islam has offered a theocratic state as an alternative to both liberalism and communism. Other less organized religious impulses have been successfully satisfied within the sphere of personal life permitted in liberal societies.

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Nationalism and other forms of racial and ethnic consciousness have been behind much of the conflict of modern times. If such passions have been muted to some extent in post-war Europe, they are still extremely powerful in the Third World. But it is not clear that nationalism represents an irreconcilable contradiction in the heart of liberalism. Only such systematic nationalisms as National Socialism qualify as formal ideologies on the level of liberalism or communism. The vast majority of the world's nationalist movements do not have a political program beyond the negative desire of independence from some other group or people. They may be a source of conflict for liberal societies, but this conflict does not arise from liberalism itself. Certainly a great deal of the world's ethnic and nationalist tension can be explained in terms of peoples who are forced to live in unrepresentative political systems that they have not chosen.

While it is impossible to rule out the sudden appearance of new ideologies or previously unrecognized contradictions in liberal societies, the present world seems to confirm that the fundamental principles of socio-political organization have not advanced terribly far since 1776 or 1789. Many revolutions fought since then have been in the name of ideologies which claimed to be more advanced than liberalism but whose pretensions were unmasked by history. In the meantime, they have helped spread the universal homogenous state to the point where it could have a significant effect on the character of world politics.

What are the implications of the end of history for international relations? Much of the Third World remains very much mired in history, and will continue to be a terrain of conflict. Nor are Russia and China likely to become liberal societies in the foreseeable future. But suppose that Marxism-Leninism ceases to drive their foreign policies—an increasingly possible prospect. How would a de-ideologized world differ from our own?

Many observers believe that beneath the skin of ideology lies a hard core of great-power national interest, and that this guarantees the persistence of competition and conflict. An important assumption held by some is that aggression and insecurity are universal characteristics of human societies rather than the product of specific historical circumstances.

When believers in this line of thought speculate about a de-ideologized world, they take as their model the classic 19th-century European balance of power. Charles Krauthammer recently argued, for example, that should Gorbachev's reforms shear the Soviet Union of its ideology, its behavior would revert to that of 19th-century imperial Russia.

The notion that ideology is something imposed on a permanent core of great-power interest, however, is questionable. The universal insecurity of the 19th-century state system was based on a belief in the legitimacy of imperialism, even on the part of supposedly liberal states like Britain. But imperialism and expansionist nationalism have both been discredited in the contemporary developed world. The concept of a "great power" is today being redefined in economic rather than military or territorial terms.

The eventual passing of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology of world historical significance, and the growing "Common Marketization" of international relations do not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se. For the world at that point would be divided between historical and post-historical parts. Conflict between these parts, and between states still in history, would still be possible. There would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and national violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out even in parts of the post-historical world; terrorism and wars of national liberation could well remain an important item on the international agenda. But large-scale conflict must involve large states still caught in the grip of history, and they are what appear to be passing from the scene.

The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns and the satisfying of consumer demands. In the post-historical period, there will be neither politics nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. Perhaps the very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.

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Where the Idea of an End Began

From Hegel to Marx, History as a Journey

THE NOTION of the end of history is not an original one. Its best-known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that historical development was purposeful. That purpose, he wrote, would be achieved by the rise of a communist utopia. The concept of history as a process with a beginning, middle and end, however, was borrowed by Marx from the German philosopher Georg F.W. Hegel.

For Hegel, all human behavior in the material world, and hence all human history, is rooted in a prior state of consciousness—that is, ideas or ideology. His view of historical change is now part of our intellectual baggage: that man has progressed through a series of primitive stages of consciousness on his path to the present, and that these stages correspond to concrete stages of social organization, such as tribal, slave-owning, theocratic and finally democratic-egalitarian societies. He believed that history culminated in an absolute moment—a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state becomes victorious.

Hegel is best known to us today as Marx's precursor. In France, however, Alexandre Kojève, a Russian emigré whose students included Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron, sought to resurrect the Hegel who proclaimed history to be at an end in 1806. Hegel saw in Napoleon's defeat of the Prussian monarchy that year the victory of the ideals of the French Revolution, and the oncoming universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality. While there was a great deal to be done in terms of liberty after 1806, the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon.

The two world wars in this century, and the attendant revolutions and upheavals, simply had the effect of extending those principles to other countries, and forcing those societies in Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully.

The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists with the consent of the governed. For Kojève, this "universal homogenous state" found real-life embodiment in post-war Europe—precisely those flabby, prosperous, self-satisfied, inward-looking, weak-willed states whose grandest project was nothing more heroic than the creation of the Common Market.

But this was only to be expected. For human history and the conflict that characterized it were based on the existence of "contradictions": the dialectic of master and slave, the transformation and mastery of nature, the struggle for the universal recognition of rights, and the dichotomy between proletarian and capitalist. But in the universal homogenous state, all prior contradictions are resolved and all human needs are satisfied. There is no struggle or conflict over "large" issues, and consequently no need for generals or statesmen; what remains is primarily economic activity.

—Francis Fukuyama